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I. Introduction

NOWADAYS IN THE UNITED STATES, a building entrepreneur needs to
get the approval of a number of public agencies before putting its project
on the market. Zoning laws, subdivision regulations, building codes,
safety rules, and environmental standards all must be satisfied. The projector is required to get multiple permits.
American local governments are well aware of the bargaining power
that inheres to their ability to veto private projects. Some have under1
taken to "leverage their police power" by exacting favors, demanding
discounts, and requiring kickbacks. The U.S. Constitution places limitations on the legality of such practices. As Justice Holmes said long ago
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 when public demands go "too
far,'' they constitute a taking of property in violation of the fourteenth
3
amendment.
In theory this constitutional prohibition against excessive regulation
protects developers from overzealous regulators. In practice it affords
little protection. A California city attorney speaking to the National Institution of Municipal Law Officers in 1974 described why. 4 He explained how cities could defend against attacks on land-use regulations,
one at a time, and one after another, and "IF ALL ELSE FAILS,
MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER
*Presented to the International Land Use Program at the 1990 Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association, August 3, 1990, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Justice Scalia coined the phrase "leverage their police power" in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 n.5 (1987) (Scalia, J.).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. Id. at 415.
4. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655-56
n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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AGAIN. " The locality could "lose the battle and still win the war. "
The city attorney's unlawyer-like burst of candor galvanized Justice
Brennan to dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
1
Diego. Brennan opined that once a court found a police power regulation had effected a ''taking'' then ''the government entity must pay just
compensation for the period commencing on the date of regulation first
affecting the 'taking' and ending on the day that the government entity
8
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.' ' He explained
why: "Such liability might ... encourage municipalities to err on the
constitutional side of police power regulations, and to develop internal
rules and operating procedures to minimize overzealous regulatory at9
tempts. "
Brennan's trial balloon rendered the land regulation lobby aghast.
Self-styled ''police power hawks'' condemned the award of damages
for temporary regulatory takings as "a seductively simplistic notion"
and prophesied doom as the chilling prospect of dollar responsibility
10
deterred local officials from making hard but necessary choices. Notwithstanding these criticisms, just six years later Brennan's view was
embraced by a majority of the Supreme Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 11
This paper considers who has the better of the argument. It looks at
two fictions from the American land control scene. The moral of these
tales may provide a good answer to the questions of whether and when
compensation should be awarded for temporary takings.
II. The Avalon City Story

Avalon City is an old rustbelt port in the northeastern United States.
Under the leadership of its cantankerous mayor, Meyer Mayer, it has
undergone a renaissance of sorts. A festival marketplace has been created in the old harbor area which attracts more tourists per square foot,
per year, than Disneyland. Another of Mayor Mayer's built-in successes is a meticulous historic restoration of the old City Hall.
As the City Hall restoration was proceeding in 1983, Bertram
Builder, a politically well-connected contractor acquired for the price of
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 661 n.26.

10. See Williams, Smith, Siemonn, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193 (1984).
11. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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$500,000 the old Avalon Hotel that stood catty-corner across the street.
The Avalon had seen better days and was then a hotel for transients
standing as a buffer between the municipal buildings and the adult entertainment district. Structurally it was a sound masonry structure of some
architectural interest, but Builder, by moving fast and using his political
clout, was able to raze the building before the architectural preservationists could mount a defense.
In 1983, once the building lot was vacant, Builder surveyed his options and determined to build a six-story office building with 50,000 net
rentable square feet. Builder's plans were consistent with existing zoning laws; accordingly he was given a building permit by the city's Department of Housing. During the 1983-84 period of construction, building inspectors visited the site daily and approved the construction
practices. Construction of the new office building cost $5.5 million.
In June 1984, when the building was substantially completed but still
not finally approved for occupancy, Builder sold it for $6.5 million to
Russell Rentier who owned and leased out a number of downtown commercial properties.
Pursuant to the terms of the contract of purchase, Rentier was responsible for obtaining all final permits necessary for the occupancy of the
new building. However, he was not terribly concerned because his lawyers and engineers indicated that it substantially met all legal requirements. His reasonable expectation was that within six months (by January 1, 1985) he would obtain these approvals and have leased the space
at $20 per square foot so as to produce gross income of $1 million per
12
year. After subtracting operating expenses, maintenance costs, taxes,
and setting aside a reserve for depreciation, Rentier reasonably expected to receive $700,000 in net income per year.
Mayor Meyer Mayer had watched the building go up with pride and
satisfaction. He counted it as yet another example of Avalon's renaissance. In the fall of 1984 he developed a more particular interest in the
building. It occurred to his Honor, the mayor, that it was just the place
in which to expand overcrowded city offices. Accordingly, he directed
the acquisition agent in the City Solicitor's office to begin negotiation
with Rentier with a view towards acquiring the building.
Negotiations bogged down; the parties were far apart in price. Rentier felt that capitalization of his net income projections for the building
at a rate of 10 percent suggested a fair market value of at least $7 mil-

12. 50,000 sq. ft.

X

$20

= $1,000,000.
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lion. The city, aware of Bertram's investment 14 and the recent sale
15
price to Rentier, was unwilling to pay more than $6.7 million. Rentier
proceeded with his plans to put the office space on the private market.
At a staff meeting with his department heads in September of 1984,
Mayor Meyer Mayer described the breakdown in negotiations and expressed his displeasure.
Several weeks later Ren tier went to the Department of Housing to obtain an occupancy permit. The City Code required that, in order for an
occupancy permit to be issued, the building inspector first make a determination that the building complied with all city ordinances and regulations. A procedure existed whereby applications were circulated to the
fire department, the water and sewer division, and the chief building
inspector to determine compliance.
Rentier's occupancy permit met a series of obstacles. The application
was first sent to the fire marshall. It took him six months to reach a decision. After inspecting the premises and finding them in complete compliance with the requirements for a "fire proof' building, he nonetheless
denied approval. In an April 1985 letter to the Department of Housing, he
explained that approval was denied because the fire department was inadequately funded by the city council. He allowed that unless there was a
25 percent increase in the department's operating budget that the building
could not be safely occupied. Rentier was notified of the grounds upon
which his application for an occupancy permit was refused.
In May of 1985, Ren tier brought suit in the Circuit Court for A val on
City and sought a writ of mandamus ordering the fire marshall to give
his approval to the application for an occupancy permit. When the case
came to trial, a year later in May of 1986, the court so ordered, holding
that it was ultra vires to deny approval based upon the fire department's
shortage of operating funds over which the applicant had no control or
responsibility.
In June of 1986, Rentier's application for a occupancy permit was
sent to the water and sewer division to determine whether the building
would be provided with water and sewer hookups. In reviewing the application, the division head found that it had sufficient available capacity to provide water and sewer service for the building. The division
head determined, however, to impose a condition on the hookups pursuant to the provisions of the newly-enacted Avalon City Ordinance §
2115 (1986), which provided, inter alia: "[A]gencies of Avalon City
13. 700,000 7 .10 = 7,000,000.
14. Land-$500,000 + Building-$5,500,000
15. $6.5 million.

= $6,000,000.
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may condition exercises of their police power on the willingness of the
regulated parties to agree to serve the pro bono publico. ''
In December 1986, the division head notified the building engineer
who in tum notified Russell Rentier that water and sewer service would
be provided only if Rentier was willing to enter into a ten-year lease with
the city pursuant to which a ground floor suite in the building would be
leased at $4 per square foot for use as a day care center for the children
of city employees.
Rentier refused to enter into such a lease, publicly attacking it as
"outright extortion," and the occupancy permit was withheld. When
efforts to resolve the deadlock broke down in June of 1987, Rentier
brought a suit in the Circuit Court for A val on City in which he sought an
injunction ordering the division of water and sewer to remove the condition. Because of a judicial backlog, the case took nine months to come to
trial. In April of 1988, the court ordered removal of the condition because there was no ''rational nexus between the exaction and the burden
which the new office building would impose on the community.''
The application for a occupancy permit was next considered by the
building engineer to determine whether it complied with all provisions
of the building code. Under an antiquated provision still on the books,
all plumbing was required to be of either copper or galvanized pipe. For
the past ten years, however, the housing department has permitted the
use of plastic pipe which is generally viewed in the trade as a cheaper
and better substitute. During the course of construction, the office of the
building inspector had given informal approval to building plans calling
for the use of plastic pipe and, on weekly inspections, the building inspector had made no complaint.
In July of 1988 the building engineer determined to require a literal
compliance with the Code after all. He turned down Rentier's permit on
the grounds that the plumbing was in noncompliance. It would have cost
approximately $100,000 for Rentier to redo the plumbing in the office
building. Instead he brought suit in the Circuit Court for Avalon City
challenging the denial of the building permit. In September of 1989, after a one year delay, the court decided for Rentier finding that literal
compliance with the Building Code's requirement that copper or galvanized pipe be used had been waived, and issued an order of mandamus
ordering issuance of the permit.
Finally, Rentier's tenacity was rewarded. In October of 1989, he was
given an occupancy permit and, on January 1, 1990, the building had a
formal opening with all the space rented out at $20 per square feet, exactly five years later than he had originally expected.
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This cautionary tale of the risks which developers face when dealing
with a city intent on muscling its police power creates a compelling case
for relief under the fourteenth amendment. The threshold question is
whether it ought to come under the '' due process'' clause or the ''taking
clause." Some courts and commentators have argued that unprincipled
regulatory behavior should be redressed as a violation of due process. 16
They argue that the gravamen of the landowner's complaint is unprincipled bureaucratic behavior-quite literally a denial of the process to
which they are due, and put down a theory of regulatory takings as novel
11
and mischievous. But for substantive and procedural reasons, the disappointed developer is better served by the "taking" clause.
In some respects, the choice of theory is immaterial. Regardless of
whether relief is sought on due process or taking grounds the standard of
review is the same: ''When a court passes judgment on the municipalities' conduct" it does not ''seek to second-guess the 'reasonableness' of
the city's decision nor to interfere the local government's resolution of
18
competing policy considerations. " In both cases, the aggrieved party
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the municipality has
19
failed to conform to ''the requirements of the Federal Constitution.''
It is in other respects that the ' 'taking' ' clause is the less burdensome.
Under a due process approach, the aggrieved party must establish that
the municipal actions were '' clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
20
welfare.' ' Russell Rentier could attempt to satisfy this burden with evidence that he was the victim of a conspiracy to depress the value of his
land so the city could acquire it at a discount-a proposition likely to be
true but virtually impossible to prove. Rentier is out of court.
When the landowner is protected from overzealous regulation under
the ''taking'' clause, however, the focus of the inquiry shifts to the objective issue of whether the land-use regulations deny all economically
21
viable use of his land. Russell Rentier and his accountant have the necessary facts at their disposal. They can prove ''the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expecta16. See, e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
350N.E.2d 381,385 N.Y.S.2d5 (1976); F. B0SSELMAN, D. CALLIES&J. BANTA, THE
TAKING ISSUE 238 (1973).
17. See sources cited in supra note 16.
18. Owen v. City oflndependence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980).
19. See id.
20. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
21. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
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tions. " 22 While the landowner's claim is certainly enhanced by proof
that he was "singled-out" for disfavored treatment, that is not a necessary element of his case. A magnitudinous loss combines with a hint of
23
bias to make the case.
Moreover, landowners have an important procedural stake in a guarantee of redress under the "taking" clause. When seeking damages for
unconstitutional misconduct by state or local officials, litigants feel a
particular need for federal protection. The Warren Court met this need
by reinterpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide both declaratory and
monetary relief against state and local deprivations of "due process"
24
and other federal rights. But the Supreme Court seems to be having
some second thoughts about allowing monetary relief. Recently it immunized the state government, itself, against any liability for damages
25
under section 1983 in both federal and state courts. Moreover, the
Court determined that local governments would only be liable in dam26
ages under section 1983 for acts "officially sanctioned or ordered. "
No redress is afforded against an informally encouraged pattern of
overzealous behavior of the sort described in the Aval on City story.
When pursuing a due process claim for damages under section 1983, the
aggrieved party is no longer guaranteed a day in court.
21
The taking clause on the other hand is self-executing. Regardless of
the interpretation of section 1983, litigants are constitutionally assured
28
an opportunity to recover damages if a regulation '' goes too far.' ' The
eleventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits federal courts
from hearing suits against a state, but the aggrieved party is guaranteed
access to state court. 29 If the suit is against a local government, both state
and federal courts have jurisdiction. 30
Therefore, under a taking theory, Russell Rentier would have a
22. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). This is
the key factual question in determining whether there is a regulatory taking. Under either a taking or due process challenge the claim of the plaintiff is advanced if he can
show that he has been "singled out" for adverse treatment. See id. at 132-34. Since this
is an equal protection notion the three strands of the fourteenth amendment become even
more intertwined.
23. See, e.g., Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121
N.E.2d 517 (1954).
24. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25. Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
26. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).
27. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
28. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
29. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
400-01 (1979).
30. See260U.S.at419-20.
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lighter burden of proof and better access to an unbiased tribunal. The
"taking" theory does have its downside, however. In order to qualify
for relief, the claimant must satisfy the court that he has pursued his
administrative remedies to the point that the taking of the property interest has ripened. 31 Omnipresent is the argument that the local officials
might have deregulated if the landowner had only exhausted one more
32
state remedy. But Russell Rentier has met even the most rigorous requirements of ripeness and exhaustion of state remedies. Through extensive and expensive litigation he has finally freed his land from the
unlawful restraints.
The question remains as to whether the fact that these restraints
proved temporary ought to disqualify Rentier from recovering the value
of the property taken. To this question, our sense of justice and economics provide an easy answer: Of course not! Unlawful regulations
took from Rentier a stream of gross income in the amount of $1 million
per year, for five years. The fact that unlawful regulations were eventually overturned sensibly relates only to the measure of Rentier's loss,
not whether it ought to be compensable.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized in condemnation cases that
the "rental that probably could have been obtained" is the proper measure of compensation. 33 The same measure seems appropriate in inverse
condemnation cases such as this one. The first step is to determine Rentier's net rental loss. Such a determination might disclose, for example,
that while Rentier was denied $1 million in annual gross rents, he saved
$280,000 in annual operating expenses for a net revenue loss of
$720,000 per year, or $60,000 per month.
Therefore, assuming that Russell Rentier lost a stream of net rent of
$60,000 per month for five years, he is entitled to recover $3.6 million 34
along with compound interest from the date when each rent payment
was due. A financial table is available to capitalize the measure of com35
pensation. If we assume that rent in the amount of $60,000 would have
been paid at the end of each month, and assume an interest rate of 10
percent (which appears to an accurate estimate of the market rate of return which Rentier is able to achieve on his investments), then mathe31. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
32. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
33. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. l (1949).
34. $60,000 X 60 = $3,600,000
35. See P. GOEBEL & N. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE MATHEMATICS & FINANCE TABLES 79-81 (1981).
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matical analysis tells us that the measure of Rentier's loss on January 1,
1990, was $4,646,224. This amount would continue to grow at a compound rate of 10 percent until payment is actually made.

* * *
In other real estate contexts the question of whether a temporary taking requires compensation may be much in doubt. Consider the followmg:

m.

The Avalon County Story

Avalon County is a growing county surrounding Avalon City on three
sides. Today it is a sprawling mix of first and second-class houses, garden apartments, old business centers, high-rises, commercial strips,
light industry, glitzy malls, and a few farms. But in 1960, when Rita
Rustic bought fifty hardscrabble acres for $5,000, it was mostly rural.
Rustic bought the vacant land, although it was unsuitable for agriculture, on the whimsical theory that someday it might be worth something. She paid the insignificant taxes and occasionally sent a man out to
whack the bushes and kill the poison ivy.
In the 1980s, local officials began searching for a location for a sanitary landfill to accommodate the county's ever-growing supply of garbage. Rustie's fifty-acre tract was not among the preferred sites. As opposition mounted at other locations, however, it came under
consideration. It appeared as one of several alternative sites in a planning document published by the county planning department in 1983.
Pursuant to state enabling legislation, the Board of Commissioners of
Avalon County was empowered to place lands being considered for
public acquisition in ''reservation'':
to reserve for parks, playgrounds, and other public purposes provided that said reservation shall continue for no longer than five years and provide further that the
properties so reserved shall be exempt from all State and county taxes during the
period.

State legislation went on to provide:
During the reservation period, no building or structure shall be erected upon the land
so reserved. No trees, topsoil, or cover shall be removed or destroyed; no grading
shall be done; nor shall any land so reserved be put to any use whatsoever, except
36
upon written approval of the Board of County Commissioners.
36. The quoted regulations are adapted from those in force in the MarylandWashington Metropolitan District in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties,
Maryland. See Maryland Nat'l Capital Parks & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286
Md. 1,405 A.2d 1064 (1979).
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On December 31, 1984, Rustic was notified by registered mail that her
fifty-acre parcel had been placed "in reservation" until December 31,
1989.
Rustic was not averse to selling the property to Avalon County at a
nice profit, but felt that the reservation left her land in limbo. Her lawyer advised her that although the reservation procedure was constitutionally suspect, the costs and delays involved in a challenge were too
great to make it worth her while. She decided to wait and see what happened.
In 1988 Rustic lost an opportunity to make some money on the property when the A valon Sand and Gravel Company offered to pay her
$100 per ton for mining rights. The firm estimated that it would take
approximately 5,000 tons. Pursuant to the terms of the reservation legislation, Rustic applied to the Board of Commissioners for permission
to permit sand and gravel mining, but it was summarily denied.
December 31, 1989 came and went without the county ever acquiring
Rustie's fifty acres. The five year reservation expired and Rita Rustic
now reconsiders whether there has been a temporary taking of her property entitling her to just compensation.
Common law and common sense agree that there was a taking. The
reservation legislation was designed to capture a public benefit not to
prevent a public harm. She was deprived of all reasonable use of her
property. Placing Rustic' s land in reservation for five years amounted
to a virtual freeze on the use of the property in its entirety. 37 The reservation legislation itself seems to recognize that there is a temporary taking
since it exempts the property from real estate taxes for the duration.
The question of whether Rustic is constitutionally guaranteed compensation is a much more difficult one. It is not at all apparent that she
has suffered any economic loss. Since she made an investment decision
to hold nonproductive land we know of no income interest she lost. She
lost a profit on the sale of the sand and gravel, but it is still in the ground
to be sold another day. Furthermore, a proscription on its taking will
probably be justified as a nuisance-prevention measure.
The events in A valon County highlight another complication in the
constitutional treatment of regulations which work a temporary taking
of property. W'nere non-income producing property is involved the
speculator may have suffered no loss. She has the burden of proof to
establish that she was prevented from taking a speculative profit when
37. Accord Maryland-Nat'! Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286
Md. I, 405 A.2d 1064 (1979).
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the market was up. In the absence of proof of a lost opportunity to seize a
capital gain the measure of just compensation is zero.
IV. Conclusion

As our stories indicate, delay is endemic under the system of multiple
permits presently used to regulate the use ofland. Sometimes this delay
can result in a taking of property under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The argument that temporary takings should not be compensated is misguided.
Good economics and good government demand compensation. Time is
money; cost internalization keeps the locals honest.
The ''police power hawks'' should prey instead on the issue of just
compensation. Difficult analytical and factual questions must be answered. Distinctions between income-producing property and vacant
land dictate different measures. Sometimes the government owes a lot,
sometimes a little, and sometimes nothing. Only an eagle's eye assures
that awards are neither too large or too small.
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